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Taxacom: FW: Concern for Dr. Misha Ignatov, fixed

Richard Zander Richard.Zander at mobot.org
Thu Sep 8 13:54:23 CDT 2022 

Apparently the attachment was not what I thought it was. Below is the letter.

You don't often get email from misha.ignatov58 at gmail.com<mailto:misha.ignatov58 at gmail.com>. Learn why this is important<https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
Dear colleagues!
Let me share with you the fears and hopes regarding the main event of the year – the conflict between Russia and the West.
It sounds as if  the war in Ukraine is a multifaceted disaster. If you haven’t heard or if you haven’t accepted that pretty much everything has gone terribly wrong for Ukraine, the West and NATO in this war then I assure you will hear about it and/or accept it within the next few months. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an existential crisis and a direct challenge to the international security order. At stake is not only Ukraine, but the future of European security. The unfolding invasion of Ukraine will have far-reaching repercussions that extend way beyond a breach of international law and a violation of the country’s territorial integrity. As American international relations expert David Yost notes,  Russia’s actions will weaken the credibility of major power security assurances, undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regim e and dampen prospects for future disarmament. The war has reached a point of extreme danger. As Simon Jenkins mentioned in the Guardian, “…will the desperation, coupled with ‘war fever’ by nonparticipants, drive the conflict into wider escalation and the risk of catastrophe?”
The transatlantic alliance will be in a deepening cycle of confrontation with Russia for the foreseeable future, regardless of the immediate outcomes in Ukraine. As long as President Vladimir Putin reigns in the Kremlin, Russia will pose the primary security threat to Western interests an d global order. As the top UK general observed, it is dangerous to assume that the war on Ukraine is a limited conflict. This could be “our 1937 moment”,  and everything possible must be done in order to stop territorial expansion by force, thereby averting a war similar to the one that ravaged Europe 80 years ago. As different variants of Armageddon are discussed, politicians, policym akers and the public are clinging to any optimism they can find. Finland and Sweden clamouring to join Nato; Moldova and Georgia joining Ukraine in lodging bids for EU membership (an important symbol of their resolve); Emmanuel Macron surely seeing off his far-right, Putin-loving challengers in France; Poland suspending its petulance towards the EU; even Hungary’s Viktor Orbán beg inning to see where his future priorities might lie; Switzerland and Monaco falling into line on dodgy money.
Putin and his aides have chosen to abandon the rational caution exercised by the majority of his Soviet predecessors. Compared to Cold War practice, today, Kremlin propagandists and officials engage in highly irresponsible rhetoric advocating for t he use of Russia’s nuclear arsenal against Ukraine, and possibly even against NATO s tates.   Putin has demonstrated a daunting risk appetite and willingness to act. The immediate targets of likely further aggression are Georgi a and Moldova, followed by the Baltic states and Poland and, to a lesser extent, Finland, Sweden, Romania, and Bulgaria. Putin’s war has not yet tested the credibility of NATO’s Article 5 collective defence guarantees. But Putin’s  increasingly irrational behaviour together with Moscow’s readiness to use the most destructive missiles and weapons systems against foreign territory targets (something practiced in Syria) in the immediate vicinity of NATO terr itory creates a new reality. Moscow has shown its readiness to use indiscriminate force for no justifiable military reasons and to engage in war crimes, all while Putin openly discusses the reclamation of lands held by tsarist Russia. If Putin is in power after the war, he may become increasingly desperate due to sanctions, global isolation, and political and military losses in Ukraine (even if the result is packaged as a victory). This c ould raise the potential for an attack or nuclear saber-rattling in response to Ukraine or Georgia’s NATO accession. Moreover, the use of nuclear weapons against targets in Ukraine – however improbable - cannot be ruled out. Allies should thus consider, as a matter of urgency, persuasive signalling to Russia about possible conventional military responses (e.g. a disabling of Russian military targets in the Bl ack Sea) that would come as a result of such acts. Only the certainty of retaliation can dissuade the Kremlin from seriously contemplating such an option.
A dangerous potential scenario and implications for European security include wider European war. Putin’s willingness to escalate the conflict in Ukraine significantly increases the potential for conflict between Russia and NATO. This encompasses a range of possibilities: from relatively low-level skirmishes in and around NAT O front-line members (the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Norway) to a major European and possibly even transcontinental war involving not only conventional armaments, but also chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. In the most drastic scenarios, the conflict between Russia and the West  would be existential. There would be little point in speculating about the future of Europe until this is resolved in one form or another – either with a decisive defeat of Putin’s Russia, the collapse of the US-led West (and of the post-Cold War settlement), some sort of negotiated settlement along the lines of Yalta 1945 (or possibly the 1953 Korean armistice), or nuclear Armageddon.
The war could also solidify a Sino-Russian military alli ance. China offers the greatest long-term external challenge to advanced democracies. Yet Russia’s deployment of military force makes it more of an immediate threat to Western interests and the liberal order. Europe and the US face these challenges together but to different degrees.
You know, the keystone of Ukrainian security was so-called Budapest Memorandum. Under the terms of the memorandum, Ukraine agreed to relinquish its nuclear arsenal – the world’s third-largest,  inherited from the collapse d Soviet Union – and transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia for decommissioning. In exchange for giv ing up its nuclear arsenal, Ukraine agreed politically binding security assurances to respect its independence and sovereignty which guaranteed its existing borders. China and France subsequently extended similar assura nces to Ukraine, but did not sign the Budapest Memorandum.
Russia first broke its commitments under the Budapest Memorandum in 2014. The international response at the time was lacklustre . Russia’s invasion of Ukraine today is an even more serious violation and effectively buries   past assurances in the Budapest Memorandum.
The West responses in the face of Russia’s recent aggression have been limited. They have ruled out any direct intervention, such as imposing no-fly zones over Ukraine,  for fear of being dragged into a war with Russia. While this limited response fulfils the letter of the US and UK’s commitments under the Budapest Memorandum, the impression that emerges is very much that Ukraine was left on its own to fight an unlawful, nuclear-capable aggressor. It is unsurprising, perhaps, that some Ukrainian leaders and the public feel betrayed and consider that the security assurances they received in the Budapest Memorandum are not worth the paper they were written on.
When a war goes as planned, when it is considered a successful war, little or no attention is paid to its causes. When a war is unsuccessful however, when it doesn’t go as planned, much attention is paid to its history, how it evolved and what went wrong. This was the case after the Vietnam war and it was the case after the Iraq war.
The West sol  Ukraine false dreams about EU inclusion and Nato membership, both of which scared Russia, given the historical, cultural and political ties between these two neighbours. After all the intelligence it had gathered over the past few months, Washington co uld have sent a peacekeeping force to Ukraine in anticipation of the war.The United States and its NATO allies played a crucial role in the events that led to the Ukraine war. In fact they are still playing a key part in shaping the conduct of the war.  This being the case, it’s appropriate to clearly evaluate the West’s responsibility in relation to this conflict. The Kremlin exposed the naivete of previous strategies toward Russia, including Germany’s  “Wandel durch Handel” (change through trade) and the Biden administration’s belief that Russia could be “parked” or neutralized . The West needs a new strategy: preparing for what could be a strategic confrontation lasting decades.  Have the populist waves, financed by and enthusiastic towards Putin, really been seen off?
Unfortunately, the Western media has early misinformed the public as to the intentions of Putin and Russia. It should be noted, t hat there was never one bit of talk (ever) about Russia having any imperialist ambitions until February of 2014. Curious no? The main danger just now is a return to the complacency and indifference that have characterized European attitudes towards Ukraine in recent years.
Ukraine’s ability to contain Russian aggression will shape the security environment for years to come. At its Summit in Madrid  in June 2022, NATO recognised this and offered an upgraded package of support. The volume and speed with which more sophisticated weapons systems (including heavy artillery, missile systems, armoured vehicles, and air defence systems) are supplied to Ukraine in the coming weeks will be decisive in preventing Russia from overrunning Ukraine’s defences. The onus is on individual Allies to ensure such help now.
Russia, as the aggressor, still has the upper hand. But, for the U.S. and its allies, th e one positive sign is that the performance of the Ukrainian military has exceeded expectations. The collective West (and specifically NATO) can count on its likely ability to contain an aggressive Russia, at least in the long run. But Ukraine’s defeat of the aggressor is the indispensable goal in this context as it would severely li mit Russia’s ability to attack other countries, provide time to augment collective defence and consolidate international unity against aggression. There is no time to lose in implementing them.
The bravery of Ukrainia ns, so far, has prevented the worst-case. A more secure Europe starts in Ukraine.
In the immediate term, a strategic vision for victory means urgently increasing any necessary military assistance by arming Ukraine with the weapons an d systems it needs not just to defend itself but to launch effective counteroffensives while protecting civilians. It means increasing economic sanctions on Russia, especially in the energy sector where Europe has been especially hesitant.
Just as the war has revealed gaps in Russian military capabilities, it has also shown that the multilateral institutions at the heart of the alliance – NATO and the European Union – were not built for crisis response.  Marek Magierowski, Poland’s Ambassador to the U.S said: Putin has been waiting for this “window of opportunity” for years. “He convinced himself that the West is weak, divided, wallowing in a decadent mood. He thought the free world wouldn’t care about Ukraine’s fate, as it didn’t care about Czechoslovakia’s in 1938,” when Europe tolerated Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland. Putin, he told me, is similarly “emboldened” because the West was “tragically lenient” and “outrageously complacent” after Russia murdered  the defector Alexander Litvinenko, in 2006; invaded and annexed Crimea,  in 2014; helped destroy the Syrian city of Aleppo,  in 2016; reportedly used chemical weapons to poison the former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, in 2018; and poisoned the opposition leader Alexey Navalny,  in 2020. Over the past three decades, Eastern Europeans have often encountered skepticism of their view of Putin as the U.S. and Western Europeans, notably the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel,  advocated dealing pragmatically with Russia.
The United Nations and the OSCE have not been able to offer meaningful responses, mainly due to the paralysing effect of Russia’s veto. Moreover, solidarity with Ukraine is not yet universal among all UN members. The suffering of Uk raine presents a moral challenge to Europe and the world. Human rights and the UN Charter have been trampled upon and our values mocked. Indifference is simply not an option. As convincingly explained by Nicholas Tenzer: this is a war against the West too.  Providing Ukraine with the minimum security assistance needed to defend itself without risking a hypothetical escalation with Russia – which is the  current policy – will not result in a more stable and secure Europe or transatlantic alliance. Public displays of solidarity with Ukraine and its yearning for democracy are all the rage. In a year’s time, will they be seen as a passing fad? As another moment of weakness by the West, or will the lessons of Berlin have been learned?
According to its own terminology, Putin’s regime has chosen confrontation with the “collective West”, irrespective of the costs for Russia itself. All efforts comprising security and confidence-building measures, or institutional arrangements designed to preserve peace, suddenly look very fragile when faced wi th blunt force. Moreover, by creating economic shocks in the energy markets and weaponising famine as a political instrument, Russia has further globalised the consequences of its war. The future of Europe is contingent on whether Russian President Vladimir Putin is able to achieve all, some, or none of his aims in Ukraine. Equally, the viability of a common European identity, democratic norm s and values, and a continental security order will be proved – or disproved – by the effectiveness of the West’s response to the worst breach of international order.
But, as the aggression continues, with Russia concentrating its efforts on gaining control of eastern and southern Ukraine via a war of attrition, Western unity is being tested. Divergent interpretations over sanctions that affect the transport of prohibited goods to Kaliningrad illustrate this problem.The three biggest economies in the EU h ave been dragging their heels on supplying arms while continuing to pour billions of euros into Moscow’s war chest by buying its energy.  Scholz’s promise of tanks and failure to deliver them and Macron’s plea that Russia shouldn’t be humiliated hav e underlined Europe’s weakness. Western incompetence has helped exacerbate yet another conflict in the world, this time in Ukraine. While it is comforting to hear that the West will fight to protect all Nato member states, but why not help friends who may not be treaty allies – such as Ukraine – as well? The sluggish Western military response h as meant that, in the east of Ukraine , Russia has a 10 to 15-fold adva ntage in artillery, the most important battle-winner in this campaign. Despite big talk by the collective West about sending multiple-launch rocket systems, a potent stand-off weapon that could help redress the balance, only a handful are being supplied against the 300 President Zelensky says he needs.
So as the Russians advance steadily over some of the most fortified terrain in the world, the Ukrainians are falling  back in the face of blistering artillery fire, with a casualty rate of up to 800 a day.  Why do they have to die? What have they done to deserve death? Can there be no way to protect them better? These are some of the questions that occurred to us. At the same time, sentiments of abandonment and resentment toward NATO may persist in Ukraine.
Early assumptions that Ukraine would decisively defeat the Russians are being unwound as Putin pushes forward, seemingly unfazed by the huge loss of life and hardware. But this new reality may not have been fully grasped even in some Western capitals. In a briefing, Colin Kahl, the  Pentagon’s defence polic y chief, claimed that Putin would not be able to capture a significant proportion of Ukraine, yet 20 per cent of the country is already in his hands. America’s complacent line prevails in Whitehall as well, which takes the extraordinary position that Russia has already been strategically defeated. If that was the case early on, it has been undermined by Putin’s recent actions and Nato’s failure to give Ukraine the military assistance it needs.  Sadly, it seems, Ukraine is paying the price for its misplace d trust in the West.
China is watching the conflict between Russia and collective West very closely. It is alarming that this affects the  emergence of a new axis of evil. What China has noticed is a lack of Western resolve over Ukraine - the same thing it noticed over Afghanistan last year. If Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, Xi will surely be further emboldened to move on Taiwan with the belief that the West might well make a lot o f noise but lacks the will for meaningful intervention.
Just months ago, we were talking about the dawn of a new, confident age for democracies, as we told ourselves the West had finally united to stand up to aggression. Now  we’re seeing the rise of a new axis of evil that threaten s us everywhere. This danger is increased by complacency in Nato, as well as by irresponsible messages of war-weariness from European leaders who ought to know better.
What happens to this remarkable and new-found cooperation when conflict fatigue sets in? Pressure will eventually pile on Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, to sue for peace, in order to restore some calm to the rest of Europe. A new narrative of betrayal would result.
We are all Ukrainians... for now. But as fuel costs  rise and a drawn-out war looms, how long will the West’s resolve last?
Famous Francis Fukuyama wrote: “The world will have learnt what the value of a liberal world order is, and that it will not survive unless people struggle for it and show each other mutual support. The Ukrainians, more than any other people, have shown what true bravery is, and that the spirit of 1989 remains alive in their corner of the world. For the rest of us, it has been slumbering and is being reawakened.”
I am ashamed of my government. But our officials do not take into accou nt the opinion of the people. Unfortunately, the peoples of Europe also  did not do everything to prevent this terrible massacre. Just like 80 years ago. History repeated itself.
And now the specter of an escalating conflict with its terrible possibilities hangs over us all. I'm afraid to think about a sadly unpredict able future.

Sincerely yours,
Michael S. Ignatov
Main Botanical Gar den of
Russian Acad emy of Scie nces,
Botaniche skaya, 4,
Mo scow 127276,
Russia

-------
Richard H. Zander
Missouri Botanical Garden – 4344 Shaw Blvd. – St. Louis – Missouri – 63110 – USA
richard.zander at mobot.org<mailto:richard.zander at mobot.org> Ofc: +1 314 577-0276
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From: bryonet-l at mtu.edu <bryonet-l at mtu.edu> On Behalf Of Richard Zander
Sent: Wednesday, September 07, 2022 7:39 PM
To: Research <Research at mobot.org>
Cc: bryonet bryonet <bryonet-l at mtu.edu>; Taxacom (taxacom at lists.ku.edu) <taxacom at lists.ku.edu>
Subject: [Bryonet] Concern for Dr. Misha Ignatov

Fellow bryologist in Moscow Misha Ignatov of _An unpredicrtable future_ apparently has had his mailbox shut down. This is _not_ good
Those who have not already perused his excellent missive should do so. It is attached.

Richard Zander

________________________________
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Sent: Wednesday, September 7, 2022 9:26 AM
To: Misha Ignatov <misha.ignatov58 at gmail.com<mailto:misha.ignatov58 at gmail.com>>
Subject: Undeliverable: FW: An unpredictable future.


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From: Richard Zander <Richard.Zander at mobot.org<mailto:Richard.Zander at mobot.org>>

To: Misha Ignatov <misha.ignatov58 at gmail.com<mailto:misha.ignatov58 at gmail.com>>

Subject: FW: An unpredictable future.

Thread-Topic: An unpredictable future.

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Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2022 14:26:05 +0000

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