[Re:]Constraints on PERCEPTION ...

[Stuart G. Poss]

In and of themselves, neither of these attributes bears any relation to
hypothesis testing, although one might hope that reviewers are using scientific
methods that might aid in distinguishing hypotheses which are "true" with respec
t
to the basis of comparison and thus to be accepted from those that are "false"
with respect to the basis of comparison and should thus to be rejected.

In discussing perceptions with respect to the scientific method, it is essential
to distinguish the two meanings of perception, as the word is typically used.
This is especially important if we are to derive some utility from the (in my
opinion unfortunate) detour along the yellow-brick road that was taken in the
discussion of the Kansas anomally.   Perception in one meaning is a property of
the senses  involved (ie "lower" level "reality collecting" circuitry of the
eyes, ears, nose, tounge, touch, and our mechanical extensions, ie calipers,
video digitizers, etc.) for which some measures can be taken (often implicitly
using some approaches, such as morphological cladistics).  "Data" as used in a
scientific context are, or at least in principle should be, derived through such
mechanisms.

A second meaning of perception, one which I suspect Thomas is alluding to,
involves the conceptual interpretation level (ie higher level "congnitive"
circuitry of "higher" brain centers) that define our "understanding" of what
these lower centers tell us.   This latter meaning, as used coloquially, blurs a
distinction that scientists (as opposed to non-scientists) must make between
those elements of observation involving the higher centers that are directly tie
d
to "data" processed by the lower centers and those that might be characterized a
s
"theory or context (state) dependent".    It is this latter aspect of perception
that is being debated in this subthread, although it is certainly not the only
one of significance with respect to a discussion of observation, "perception",
and the scientific method, particularly as they relate to the establishment of
the reality of evolution (or any other phenomenon) as a scientifically
demonstrable fact.

For different senses the distinction may be subtle and difficult to make
operationally, particularly for vision where the function of lower centers of
perception are not under direct control of the higher integrative centers of
perception or where the sensors are devices that do the "sensing" for us and are
necessarily indirect and require use of  both higher and lower perceptive center
s
for appropriate interpretation of "reality".  Likewise, as others have already
noted, they need not be the same for all organisms or individuals, since they ma
y
have fundamentally different circuitry.  With respect to observations of
evolution, as noted by Professor Gould in a timely and worthwhile commentary in
the most recent Time magazine, natural selection often can not  not be directly
observed by humans because their senses do not operate over the time scales
involved. although examples of directly observable natural selection and
evolution among microbes and viruses are well-known, but perhaps not interesting
enough to a paleontologist to be mentioned in his article.

With respect to the notions of "constraints on perception"  it might be more
useful to discuss the constraints scientists impose on inference from "data" tha
t
need not be of concern to non-scientists, rather than the constraints imposed on
perception per se.  I am aware of no evidence that suggests that lower or higher
"perceptive centers" among scientists and non-scientists differ appreciably on
average.   The critical difference between scientists (even "normal" ones) and
non-scientists involved different methods of inference and not "perception" per
se, although molecular and developmental genetics and neurophysiology may one da
y
show that the facility with which humans employ particular inference methods, ma
y
be partially "hard wired" as a result of natural selection.

With respect to the Kansas anomaly and dead-ends in the yellow-brick road, it
might be more useful to better understand and debate the methods of inference
used by the School board in making their decision, so that the scientific
community can better educate the broader public of the critical importance of
teaching evolution in the classroom.  Gould aptly concludes his article by notin
g
that the correctness of Darwinian theory is at the core of contemporary
biological science.  A failure by the public to understand evolution and its
consequences and to support its scientific investigation does not bode well for
the responsiblities we must take on, as noted in the companion Times cover
article on human evolution , as we now chart our own "human-mediated" selection
in this brave new world of overpopulation, human-induced climatic and land use
changes, and genetic bioengineering.

Thomas Schlemmermeyer wrote:

> Thank you for this iluminating and insightful comments.
>
> Perceptions of scientists are still orders of magnitude more constrained than
> perceptions of normal individuals, for two simple reasons:
>
> 1.) Our work is peer-reviewed
> 2.) Our work is usually not financed by ourselves
>
>



--
_____________________________________________________________________
Stuart G. Poss                       E-mail: Stuart.Poss at usm.edu
Senior Research Scientist & Curator  Tel: (228)872-4238
Gulf Coast Research Laboratory       FAX: (228)872-4204
P.O. Box 7000
Ocean Springs, MS  39566-7000